

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of decision: 03rd September, 2021

IN THE MATTER OF:

+ BAIL APPLN. 2487/2021
SUVALEEN

..... Petitioner

Through: Mr. Dinesh Kumar Tiwari, Advocate.
versus

THE STATE, (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) Respondent

Through: Mr. S. V. Raju, ASG with Mr. Amit Prasad, SPP for the State along with Mr. Anshuman Raghuvanshi and Mr. Ayodhya Prasad, Advocates and DCP Rajesh Deo, Legal and Crime Branch and Insp. Gurmeet Singh, Crime Branch

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.

1. The Petitioner herein has approached this Court for grant of regular bail in FIR No.60/2020 dated 25.02.2020 registered at PS Dayalpur for offences under Sections 186/353/332/323/147/148/149/336/427/302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”) and Sections 3/4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (hereinafter, “PDPP Act”).

2. The FIR relates to the violence that took place in the National Capital Territory of Delhi in the month of February 2020.

3. The brief facts leading to the instant Bail Application are that a protest against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (hereinafter, “CAA”) had been taking place for 1.5 months prior to the incident at Khajuri Square to Loni Circle at Wazirabad Road, Chand Bagh near 25 Futa Service Road by

the Muslim community.

4. It is stated in the instant FIR that the Complainant, i.e. Constable Sunil Kumar, was on duty with the deceased, HC Ratan Lal, and others, namely Giri Chand, Ct. Mahavir, Ct. Jitender, HC Narender, HC Brijesh, W/HC Savitri, as well as DCP Shahdara District Amit Kumar and his staff.

5. It is stated that on 24.02.2020, at about 01:00 PM the protestors had mobilized near the Chand Bagh area and 25 Futa Road, and were moving towards the Main Wazirabad Road. When they assembled near Main Wazirabad Road, it is stated that the Complainant and other police officers present attempted to convince the protestors to not move towards the Main Wazirabad Road, however, it is stated that the protestors were carrying sticks, baseball sticks, iron rods and stones. It is stated that ACP Gokalpuri and DCP Shahdara warned the protestors via loudspeaker of a government vehicle that lack of adherence to legal warnings would necessitate strict action against the crowd. It is stated that some people amongst the crowd started pelting stones at the police officials, and beat them as well as other passersby with aforementioned weapons that had been hidden.

6. It is stated that the Complainant herein received an injury on his right elbow and right hand due to a huge stone. It is further stated that the crowd even snatched tear gas balls and lathis from the police, and started beating them with it. It is stated that ACP Gokalpuri, HC Ratan Lal and DCP Shahdara Amit Kumar were also beaten with sticks and stones, and as a result, they fell down and suffered grievous head injuries.

7. The FIR states that post the incident, the protestors fled away and the injured were sent to a hospital, with the Complainant receiving treatment at Panchsheel Hospital, Yamuna Vihar, Delhi.

8. The Complainant then states that he was informed that HC Ratan Lal had succumbed to a bullet injury, and some other police officers as well as public persons had also suffered injuries. It is stated that the protestors had also set fire to the vehicle of DCP Shahdara and private vehicles of police officers, and also damaged public and private property.

9. It is stated that investigation is now completed and chargesheet has been filed against the Petitioner on 08.06.2020 wherein the Petitioner has been added. The chargesheet states that there is sufficient material to proceed against the Petitioner herein under Sections 186/353/332/323/109/144/147/148/149/153A/188/333/336/427/307/308/302/201/120-B/34 of the IPC, read with 3/4 of the PDPP Act. Thereafter, supplementary chargesheets have been filed on 30.06.2020, 20.08.2020, 17.11.2020 and 30.12.2020.

10. Mr. Dinesh Kumar Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has submitted that the Petitioner herein has been falsely implicated in the instant FIR, and that there exists no clinching evidence which can prove the connection of the Petitioner to the incident.

11. It has further been submitted to the Court by Mr. Tiwari that the Petitioner has been in judicial custody since 17.05.2020 and has not even received interim bail. The Court has been informed that the Petitioner is only 18 years of age and is the sole bread earner of a family with aged parents.

12. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner states that the investigation has been completed and chargesheet has been filed, and therefore, the custody of the Petitioner is no longer required for the purpose of investigation. Moreover, it has been submitted that keeping the Petitioner in custody with

other hardened criminals will serve no fruitful purpose and will only be injurious to the health of the Petitioner.

13. On the aspect of evidence, Mr. Tiwari has argued that neither is there any electronic evidence like CCTV footage, video clip etc. against the Petitioner in the instant case, but also that the exact CDR location of the Petitioner has not been established by the prosecution and is inconclusive as the Petitioner is the resident of the area.

14. Mr. Tiwari has brought the attention of the Court to the bail order dated 16.02.2021 of this Hon'ble Court in Bail Appln. No. 3550/2020 wherein co-accused Mohd. Danish has been enlarged on bail, and has submitted that this bail order entitles the Petitioner herein to be released on parity.

15. It has been submitted that no public witnesses are present in the matter against the Petitioner and that the Petitioner has only been arrested on the basis of the disclosure statements of other co-accused.

16. Mr. Tiwari contends that the only link between the petitioner and his involvement in the incident is the recovery of a mobile phone from him which belongs to Inspector Narender Singh. He states that the petitioner was in Bulandshahar and the phone was pledged to him. He states that just because the phone of the Inspector was recovered from him does not lead to a conclusion that he was a part of the protest, and therefore, his prolonged incarceration is not justified. Furthermore, he has submitted that the Petitioner has no criminal history or previous convictions. It has also been stated that the Petitioner has no motive to commit a heinous offence.

17. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has gone on to argue that Article 21 of the Constitution of India states that, "No person shall be

deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”, and this includes the right to live with dignity. Therefore, the continued incarceration of the Petitioner would violate his liberty and deprive him of his personal freedom.

18. Mr. Tiwari, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has stated before the Court that the Petitioner will not misuse the concession of liberty, will maintain good behaviour during the period of bail, and will appear before the Trial Court and co-operate in the expeditious disposal of the case. He has concluded his submissions on the note that the rule is to allow bail and that bail should not be the punishment in itself as the basic principle of criminal law dictates that an accused shall be presumed innocent till proven guilty.

19. Mr. Amit Prasad, learned SPP for the State, supplemented the arguments of the learned ASG and has painstakingly taken this Court through the videos pertaining to the topography of the area where the riots happened and the preparatory work that allegedly took place prior to the incident. Mr. Prasad brought to the attention of the Court three videos that had been found during the course of investigation which depict the scene of crime - Vishal Chaudhry Video (1.48 minutes) shot from Gym Body Fit Garage, Skyride Video (1.37 minutes) and Yamuna Vihar Video (40 seconds), and has submitted that the three videos shed a light on how the assault on the police personnel was pre-meditated. The learned APP has further taken this Court through all the available CCTV footage displaying timestamps and respective *galis* (lanes) wherein the accused have been caught on camera. He has further pointed out the timestamps which showcase the dislocation and deactivation of the CCTV cameras and has

submitted that the same has been done in a synchronised and planned manner.

20. The learned ASG Shri SV Raju, opposing the Bail Application, has submitted that the instant case is regarding the brutal assault on police officials wherein HC Ratan Lal succumbed to his injuries, and DCP Shahdara Amit Sharma and ACP Gokalpuri suffered grievous injuries along with more than 50 police officials also getting injured.

21. It has been submitted that the death of HC Ratan Lal was the first death in the North-East Delhi riots, and that the Trial Court has been dealing with the riot cases since then. It has also been submitted that the Trial Court has been apprised of the matter and has already dismissed the bail application of the Petitioner herein, and that the order of rejection of bail does not contain any legal infirmities.

22. The learned ASG has iterated that on 23.02.2020, the protestors who were convened at Wazirabad Main Road, Chand Bagh, unauthorizedly came onto the road and blocked the same. He submitted that in response to the same, the local police had issued a proclamation under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. in order to bring the law and order under control. He further submitted that the protestors held a meeting on the night of 23.02.2020 at Chand Bagh to finalise a plan for 24.02.2020 as the President of the United States, Donald Trump, was coming to New Delhi. This meeting subsequently attended by several of the accused persons.

23. The learned ASG has submitted that on the morning on 24.02.2020, CCTV cameras which had been installed by GNCTD for security in the area was systematically disconnected or damaged or dislocated right from 08:00:41 AM to 12:50:57 PM. He argued before the Court that the protest at

Chand Bagh continued despite the proclamation of Section 144 Cr.P.C. orders. As a consequence, police officials had been deployed for law and order arrangements. The learned ASG averred that between 12:30 PM and 1:00 PM, at the behest of the organisers of the protest, a crowd carrying various weapons such as *dandas*, *lathis*, baseball bats, iron rods, and stones convened at the main Wazirabad Road, and refused to pay heed to the orders of the senior officers and police force. The crowd soon got out of control and started pelting stones at the police officers and resultantly, more than fifty police personnel suffered injuries and HC Ratan Lal was shot dead. It was further submitted by the learned ASG that the protestors turned violent, burnt private and public vehicles, as well as other properties in the vicinity, including a petrol pump and a car showroom.

24. It was then submitted by the learned ASG that absence of an accused from a video does not translate into absence of the accused from the scene of crime. He has argued that the role of the accused could be discerned from the statement of Inspector Narender Singh under Section 161 CrPC wherein he had seen a photo of the Petitioner and identified him. The learned ASG stated that the statement of Insp. Narender Singh sheds a light on how the Petitioner had joined the protest and pelted stones at the police officials at the site of the alleged incident. He has submitted that the Petitioner, along with his associates, assaulted the police officials who were stuck at the divider of the Main Wazirabad Road, and when the police officials became unconscious, he looted their mobile phone etc. Furthermore, it has been submitted that the Petitioner thereafter left Delhi for his village in Bulandshahar, Uttar Pradesh. It was also submitted that when the IMEI of the looted mobile phone was run, the same was found in Bulandshahar and

consequently, raids were conducted and the Petitioner was arrested. Further, the looted mobile phone of Inspector Singh was recovered from the Petitioner and taken into police custody. Additionally, when the Petitioner was produced before the Ld. Duty MM for conducting the Judicial Test Identification Parade, the Petitioner had refused to participate in the TIP.

25. The learned ASG relied upon Masalti and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1964) 8 SCR 133, and submitted that by way of application of Section 149 IPC, the Petitioner herein would be deemed to be a member of the unlawful assembly and, therefore, would be equally and squarely liable for the crime committed.

26. The learned ASG has also contended that the addition of the offence under Section 302 IPC means that ordinarily bail should not be granted. He has argued that it was not a case of a simple offence; if it was a grievous offence which was specially punishable with death, then bail could not be granted. On the issue of the parameters of bail, the learned ASG has submitted that in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the principle underlying Section 437 is towards grant of bail *except* in cases where there appears to be reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and also when there are other valid reasons to justify refusal of bail. He has argued that the overriding considerations in granting bail are, *inter alia*, the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed. The learned ASG has submitted that in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791, the Supreme Court had held that in addition to the triple test or tripod test, gravity of the offence had to be considered while making a

decision on grant of bail. Further, one of the circumstances to consider the gravity of offence would be the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence which the accused is said to have committed. The learned ASG has argued that as the instant case pertains to the offence of the murder of a police officer and Section 302 IPC has been invoked, the matter lies within the four corners of the gravest of grave offences, and therefore, the accused cannot be entitled to bail.

27. Mr. Raju, the learned ASG, has then contended that conspiracy had been established on 23 February, 2020, and that the offence was pre-planned. He has submitted that meetings were held 1-2 days prior to the alleged incident wherein the protestors were motivated to gather at the site of the alleged incident on 24.02.2020 in order to instigate violence, and therefore, there was a meeting of minds due to which Section 149 and Section 120B of the IPC were made out. Furthermore, secret codes had been used, and the Petitioner herein was fully involved.

28. It was also submitted by the learned ASG that there was only a small contingent of police officers present, and they were trying to protect themselves from the frontal attack by the crowd as they were outnumbered. He argued that had it been a simple protest, the crowd would not have been required to come with sticks, weapons etc. Furthermore, if sticks and other weapons were to be utilised for self-defence, then the damage and dislocation of CCTVs defeated the case because such an action would only lead to the inference that the accused wished to destroy the evidence or to ensure that the evidence did not surface.

29. The Court has heard the learned ASG SV Raju with Mr. Amit Prasad, learned SPP for the State, and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Tiwari, learned Counsel

for the Petitioner. The Court has also perused the material on record.

30. The chargesheet on record states that the Petitioner is a resident of Mustafabad in Delhi, but he hails from Bulandshahar in Uttar Pradesh. It states that he is a tailor by profession and is 18 years old. It states that the Petitioner came to know on 23.02.2020 that the protest was going to get violent and, therefore, he joined the protest on 24.02.2020 and had taken sticks with him. The chargesheet then states that when the protestors started pelting stones at the police officials, the Petitioner was also involved, and when the police officials became unconscious, he looted their mobile phone etc. The chargesheet then reveals that thereafter, the Petitioner left Delhi for Bulandshahar and took shelter there. It is then stated in the chargesheet that during investigation, the IMEI number of the looted phone was located at Bulandshahar, and consequently, raids were conducted wherein the Petitioner was arrested and the looted mobile phone of Inspector Narender Singh was recovered and taken into police custody. The chargesheet also states that the Petitioner was produced before the Ld. Duty MM for Judicial TIP, however, he refused to participate in the same.

31. In the instant case, the issue which arises for consideration is whether when an offence of murder is committed by an unlawful assembly, then whether each person in the unlawful assembly should be denied the benefit of bail regardless of his role in the unlawful assembly or the object of the unlawful assembly. In order to understand the contention of the learned ASG, it is useful to refer to Section 149 IPC which reads as follows:

***“149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.-
If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object***

of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

(emphasis supplied)

32. The Supreme Court has consistently held that in order to convict an accused with the aid of Section 149, a clear finding needs to be given by the Court regarding the nature of unlawful common object. Furthermore, if any such finding is absent or if there is no overt act on behalf of the accused, the mere fact that the accused was armed would not be sufficient to prove common object.

33. In Kuldip Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 324, the Supreme Court has categorically stated:

“39. It is not the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 149 to render every member of unlawful assembly liable to punishment for every offence committed by one or more of its members. In order to attract Section 149, it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of unlawful assembly and it must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. If the members of the assembly knew or were of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of the common object, they would be liable for the same under Section 149.”

34. In Sherey and Ors. v. State of U.P., (1991) Supp (2) SCC 437, the Supreme Court, while considering a matter on merits after the conclusion of the trial and deciding whether Section 149 of the IPC could be applied to

hold an accused constructively liable on the basis of omnibus allegations made by witnesses and on the basis of their mere presence at the spot/scene of crime, had observed as follows:

“4. We have carefully gone through the evidence. We have no doubt that all the eye-witnesses were present. Nothing significant has been elicited in their cross-examination. However, the eye-witnesses simply named these appellants and identified them. So, the question is whether it is safe to convict all the appellants. In a case of this nature, the evidence of the witnesses has to be subjected to a close scrutiny in the light of their former statements. The earliest report namely the FIR has to be examined carefully. No doubt in their present deposition they have described the arms carried by the respective accused but we have to see the version given in the earliest report. In that report PW 1 after mentioning about the earlier proceedings has given a fairly detailed account of the present occurrence. He has mentioned the names of the witnesses and also the names of the three deceased persons. Then he proceeded to give a long list of names of the accused and it is generally stated that all of them were exhorting and surrounded the PWs and the other Hindus and attacked them. But to some extent specific overt acts are attributed to appellants 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 17, 22 and 25. It is mentioned therein that these nine accused were armed with deadly weapons and were seen assaulting the deceased Ram Narain and others. Now in the present deposition he improved his version and stated that in addition to these nine accused, five more persons also attacked the deceased and others. In view of this variation we think that it is safe to convict only such of the appellants who are consistently mentioned as having participated in the attack from the stage of earliest report. With regards the rest PW 1 mentioned in an omnibus way that they were armed with lathis. He did not attribute any overt act to any

one of them. Further, the medical evidence rules out any lathis having been used. The doctor found only incised injuries on the dead bodies and on the injured PWs. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the prosecution case that the other appellants were members of the unlawful assembly with the object of committing the offences with which they are charged. We feel it highly unsafe to apply Section 149 IPC and make everyone of them constructively liable. But so far as the above nine accused are concerned the prosecution version is consistent namely that they were armed with lethal weapons like swords and axes and attacked the deceased and others. This strong circumstance against them establishes their presence as well as their membership of the unlawful assembly. The learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently contended that the fact that the Muslims as a body came to the scene of occurrence would show that they were members of an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing various offences including that of murder. Therefore all of them should be made constructively liable. But when there is a general allegation against a large number of persons the Court naturally hesitates to convict all of them on such vague evidence. Therefore we have to find some reasonable circumstance which lends assurance...” (emphasis added)

35. It is, therefore, noted that the applicability of Section 149 IPC, specifically read with Section 302, cannot be done on the basis of vague evidence and general allegations. When there is a crowd involved, at the juncture of grant or denial of bail, the Court must hesitate before arriving at the conclusion that every member of the unlawful assembly inhabits a common intention to accomplish the unlawful common object. There cannot be an umbrella assumption of guilt on behalf of every accused by the Court,

and every decision must be taken based on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances in the matter therein. This principle, therefore, gains utmost importance when the Court considers the question of grant or denial of bail.

36. With regard to the submission that if there appears to be reasonable grounds that the accused has committed an offence which is punishable with death or life imprisonment, then there is a bar imposed by Section 437(1) Cr.P.C on granting of bail, this Court states that the case of Gurcharan Singh(supra) also acknowledges that it is the Court which has the last say on whether there exists any reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of committing the said offence. Furthermore, there is no blanket bar as such which is imposed on the Court on granting of bail in such cases and that the Court can exercise discretion in releasing the accused, as long as reasons are recorded which clearly disclose how the discretion has been exercised. Additionally, in the case of the Prabhakar Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2020) SCCOnline 75, the Supreme Court has held that despite an alleged offence being grave and serious, and there being several criminal cases pending against the accused, these factors by themselves cannot not be the basis for the refusal of prayer for bail. In Gurcharan Singh (supra), the Supreme Court had held as follows:

“24. Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code, on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment of life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High

Court or the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code. The overriding considerations in granting of bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. of the new Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.”

37. The Petitioner was arrested on 17.05.2020 and has been in judicial custody since then. It has been 16 months since the arrest of the Petitioner. Bail jurisprudence attempts to bridge the gap between the personal liberty of an accused and ensuring social security remains intact. It is the intricate balance between the securing the personal liberty of an individual and ensuring that this liberty does not lead to an eventual disturbance of public order. It is egregious and against the principles enshrined in our Constitution to allow an accused to remain languishing behind bars during the pendency of the trial. Therefore, the Court, while deciding an application for grant of bail, must traverse this intricate path very carefully and thus take multiple

factors into consideration before arriving at a reasoned order whereby it grants or rejects bail.

38. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, the Supreme Court laid down the parameters for granting or refusing the grant of bail which are as under:

- “i. whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;*
- ii. nature and gravity of the accusation;*
- iii. severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;*
- iv. Danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;*
- v. character, behavior, means, position and standing of the accused;*
- vi. Likelihood of the offence being repeated;*
- vii. Reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and*
- viii. Danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”*

In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118, the Supreme Court had observed as under:

“12. The determination of whether a case is fit for the grant of bail involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima facie view of the involvement of the accused are important. No straitjacket formula exists for courts to assess an application for the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a case is fit for grant of bail, the court is not required to enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime by the

accused. That is a matter of trial. However, the Court is required to examine whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence and on a balance of the considerations involved, the continued custody of the accused subserves the purpose of the criminal justice system. Where bail has been granted by a lower court, an appellate court must be slow and ought to be guided by the principles set out for the exercise of the power to set aside bail.”

39. It is the Constitutional duty of the Court to ensure that there is no arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty in the face of excess of State power. Bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and Courts must exercise their jurisdiction to uphold the tenets of personal liberty, subject to rightful regulation of the same by validly enacted legislation. The Supreme Court has time and again held that Courts need to be alive to both ends of the spectrum, i.e. the duty of the Courts to ensure proper enforcement of criminal law, and the duty of the Courts to ensure that the law does not become a tool for targeted harassment.

40. As has been stated above, the Petitioner herein has been in custody for 17 months and was formally added by way of chargesheet dated 08.06.2020. A perusal of the material on record has revealed to the Court that the Petitioner has not been caught on any video footage in the vicinity of the protest site. The submission that the looted mobile phone of Inspector Narender Singh was found in the possession of the Petitioner and that he had fled to Bulandshahar, U.P. post the alleged incident cannot be employed at this point as a substantial ground for the continued incarceration of the Petitioner. Whether or not the possession of the looted mobile phone and the

Petitioner's consequent fleeing away to his home town is conclusive of his presence at the spot of the alleged incident/Scene of Crime is not to be delved into at this juncture by this Court and is a matter of trial.

41. The fourth chargesheet has already been filed, and trial in the matter is likely to take a long time. This Court is of the opinion that it would not be prudent to keep the Petitioner, who is merely 18 years of age, behind bars for an undefined period of time at this stage. Continued incarceration of the Petitioner with hardened criminals will only be detrimental and, thus, is not justified. The Petitioner has roots in society, and, therefore, there is no danger of him absconding and fleeing. Furthermore, the two co-accused of the Petitioner have been enlarged on bail *vide* Bail Appln. 1360/2021 dated 24.05.2021, and Bail Appln. 3550/2021 dated 16.02.2021.

42. In view of the facts and circumstances of the cases, without commenting on the merits of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner cannot be made to languish behind bars for a longer period of time, and that the veracity of the allegations levelled against him can be tested during trial.

43. Accordingly, this Court is inclined to grant bail to the Petitioner in FIR No. 60/2020 dated 25.02.2020 registered at PS Dayalpur for offences u/s 186/353/332/323/109/144/147/148/149/153A/188/333/336/427/307/308/397 /412/302/201/120-B/34 of the IPC, read with 3/4 of the PDPP Act on the following conditions:

- a) The Petitioner shall furnish a personal bond in the sum of ₹35,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court/Duty Magistrate.

- b) The Petitioner shall not leave NCT of Delhi without prior permission of this Court.
- c) The Petitioner shall report to the concerned Police Station every Tuesday and Thursday at 10:30 AM and should be released after completing the formalities within half an hour.
- d) The Petitioner is directed to give all his mobile numbers to the Investigating Officer and keep them operational at all times.
- e) The present address which has been given by the Petitioner is House No. 426, Gali No. 6, Nehru Vihar, Mustafabad, Delhi. The Petitioner is directed to continue to reside at the same address. In case there is any change in the address, the Petitioner is directed to intimate the same to the IO.
- f) The Petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, tamper with evidence or try to influence the witnesses.
- g) Violation of any of these conditions will result in the cancellation of the bail given to the Petitioner.

29. It is made clear that the observations made in this Order are only for the purpose of grant of bail and cannot be taken into consideration during the trial.

44. Accordingly, the bail application is disposed of along with the pending application(s), if any.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.

SEPTEMBER 03, 2021

Rahul